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Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Der Großteil der Mindestlohnforschung beschäftigt sich mit den durchschnittlichen Beschäf-
tigungseffekten für Arbeitnehmer mit einem bindenden Mindestlohn, deren Lohn erhöht werden
muss, damit er dem Mindestlohnniveau entspricht. Abhängig von der Produktionstechnolo-
gie könnten allerdings auch Arbeitnehmer ohne bindenden Mindestlohn betroffen sein. Die
gegenwärtige Literatur erachtet diese Art von Beschäftigungs-Spillover-Effekten vor allem als
potenzielle Quelle von verzerrten Schätzergebnissen.
Die vorliegende Arbeit ergänzt die bisherige Literatur zu Beschäftigungs-Spillover-Effekten
von Mindestlöhnen, indem sie sich die Einführung des Mindestlohns und darauf folgende Lohn-
erhöhungen im Dachdeckerhandwerk zunutze macht. Mit einem Verhältnis von Mindestlohn-
niveau zu Medianlohn von ungefähr 1 muss die Betroffenheit in Ostdeutschland selbst im in-
ternationalen Vergleich als außerordentlich hoch eingestuft werden. Deshalb bietet die Branche
die ideale Grundlage, um Beschäftigungseffekte entlang der gesamten Lohnverteilung zu un-
tersuchen. Im Einzelnen betrachtet die Studie die Wahrscheinlichkeit, für Erwerbstätige mit
und ohne bindenden Mindestlohn im Dachdeckergewerbe angestellt zu bleiben, und nutzt die
Installationsbranche, die nicht von einem Mindestlohn betroffen ist, als einen geeigneten Ver-
gleichssektor. Indem der kontrafaktische Lohn geschätzt wird, den die Vergleichsgruppe der
Installateure in der Dachdeckerbranche erhalten würde, können Rückschlüsse auf die Beschäfti-
gungseffekte entlang der gesamten Lohnverteilung gezogen werden.
Die Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit, auch nach der Mindestlohn-
einführung in der Dachdeckerbranche weiter beschäftigt zu bleiben, gesunken ist. Dies trifft
vor allem für Ostdeutschland zu, wo die Betroffenheit vom Mindestlohn besonders groß war.
Allerdings scheint die Wirkung, die durch den Vergleich von Arbeitnehmern mit und ohne
bindenden Mindestlohn festgestellt wurde, im intersektoralen Vergleich unterschätzt zu wer-
den, was auf Beschäftigungs-Spillover hinweist. Zudem deutet der intersektorale Vergleich auf
negative Beschäftigungsergebnisse für ostdeutsche Arbeitnehmer entlang der gesamten Lohn-
verteilung hin. Branchenvertreter vermuten, dass dies eher durch die Substitution von Arbeit
durch Kapital hervorgerufen werden als durch Skaleneffekte.
Unsere Erkenntnisse zu den Beschäftigungswirkungen von Mindestlöhnen sollten allerdings
nicht mit der Gesamtwirkung des Mindestlohns gleichgesetzt werden, weil beispielsweise Ein-
Personen-Unternehmen nicht in unserer Analyse erfasst werden. Außerdem sollte man angesichts
der branchenspezifischen Rahmenbedingungen vorsichtig mit der Übertragbarkeit unserer Ergeb-
nisse auf andere Sektoren umgehen. Trotz dieser Vorbehalte machen die vorliegenden Resultate
die Notwendigkeit deutlich, die Analyse auch auf Beschäftigte auszuweiten, die nicht direkt vom
Mindestlohn betroffen scheinen. Zudem stellen unsere Ergebnisse jegliche Versuche in Frage,
Beschäftigungseffekte von Mindestlöhnen durch einen Vergleich von Arbeitnehmern mit und
ohne bindenden Mindestlohn innerhalb eines bestimmten Sektors zu identifizieren.
Non-technical summary
Most minimum wage research focuses on the average employment effect that minimum wages
exert on workers with a binding minimum wage, i.e. workers whose wage has to be raised in order
to comply with the minimum wage level. However, depending on the production technology,
the minimum wage may also affect workers for whom the minimum wage is not binding. The
existing literature mainly discusses such employment spillovers as a potential source of bias.
This paper contributes to this sparse literature on employment spillovers on minimum wages
by exploiting the minimum wage introduction and subsequent increases in the German roofing
sector. With a ratio of the minimum wage level and the median of around 1 in Eastern Germany,
the bite has to be considered exceptional even by international standards. Therefore, the German
roofing sector serves as an ideal setting to study employment effects along the entire wage
distribution. In particular, we look at the chances of remaining employed in the roofing sector
for workers with and without a binding minimum wage and use the plumbing sector, which is
not subject to a minimum wage, as a benchmark sector. By estimating the counterfactual wage
plumbers would receive in the roofing sector given their characteristics, we are able to identify
employment effects along the entire wage distribution.
The findings indicate that the chances of remaining employed in the roofing sector have
deteriorated due to the minimum wage introduction, especially in Eastern Germany where the
bite of the minimum wage was particularly hard. However, the impact suggested by compar-
ing workers with and without a binding minimum wage appears to be underestimated in the
intersectoral comparison, thus hinting at employment spillovers. Moreover, an intersectoral com-
parison suggests negative employment outcomes for East German workers along the entire wage
distribution. According to personal interviews with sector insiders, capital-labour substitution
rather than scale effects drive this finding.
These findings on the impact of the minimum wage regulations on the chances of continued
employment should not, however, be equated with the overall minimum wage impact since, for
instance, single-person companies are not accounted for by our analysis. Furthermore, given
the specific conditions of the roofing sector, a transferability of the results to other sectors has
to be viewed with caution. Despite these reservations, the presented evidence clearly highlights
the need for a broader perspective on employment effects of minimum wages by also taking a
closer look at workers who do not appear to be affected by the minimum wage at a first glance.
Moreover, our results put doubts on any attempt to identify employment effects of minimum
wages by comparing workers with and without a binding minimum wage within a covered sector.
The Minimum Wage Affects Them All: Evidence on
Employment Spillovers in the Roofing Sector∗
Bodo Aretz†
ZEW Mannheim
Melanie Arntz ‡
ZEW Mannheim & University of Heidelberg
Terry Gregory§
ZEW Mannheim
September 2012
Abstract
This paper contributes to the sparse literature on employment spillovers on mini-
mum wages by exploiting the minimum wage introduction and subsequent increases
in the German roofing sector that gave rise to an internationally unprecedented
hard bite of a minimum wage. We look at the chances of remaining employed in
the roofing sector for workers with and without a binding minimum wage and use
the plumbing sector that is not subject to a minimum wage as a suitable bench-
mark sector. By estimating the counterfactual wage that plumbers would receive
in the roofing sector given their characteristics, we are able to identify employment
effects along the entire wage distribution. The results indicate that the chances for
roofers to remain employed in the sector in eastern Germany deteriorated along the
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1 Introduction
Most minimum wage research focusses on the average employment effect that minimum
wages exert on workers with a binding minimum wage, i.e. workers whose wage has to be
raised in order to comply with the minimum wage level. In a competitive labour market
with a heterogenous workforce and an elastic product demand, for example, workers for
whom the minimum wage raises labour costs are expected to experience negative employ-
ment outcomes1 (Brown 1999). However, depending on the production technology, the
minimum wage (in short MW) may also affect workers for whom the minimum wage is
not binding, see e.g. Neumark and Wascher (2008). If workers with and without a bind-
ing minimum wage are complements, a negative scale effect that results from a reduced
product demand negatively affects all workers’ employment chances. If the two types of
workers are substitutes, the MW may raise the demand for workers who earn a wage
above the MW, thereby counteracting the negative scale effect by a positive substitu-
tion effect. In this case, we may observe negative employment effects for workers with a
binding MW and even positive employment effects for workers with a non-binding MW.
Moreover, profit-maximising firms may potentially substitute capital for the relatively
more expensive labour input, thereby inducing an additional employment decline for all
workers who are substitutable by capital. In this latter case, a firm might, in fact, lay off
the poorest performers of each type of worker and reduce employment also among workers
with a non-binding MW.
The existing literature mainly discusses employment spillovers, i.e. indirect employ-
ment effects for workers with a non-binding minimum wage, as a potential source of bias.
Linneman (1982), Currie and Fallick (1996), Abowd et al. (2000), and Neumark et
al. (2000), e.g., identify the average employment effect on workers with a binding MW by
comparing workers with and without a binding MW. Attempts to estimate substitution
effects between workers tend to focus on the elasticity of substitution between skill or age
groups rather than between workers with and without a binding MW.2 The only study
1In case of a monopsonistic labour market that allows employers to set wages below the equilibrium
wage, a minimum wage may instead induce positive or zero employment effects.
2See e.g. Neumark and Wascher (1995) for the substitution between age groups, Abowd and Kil-
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that we are aware of that focuses on employment effects along the wage distribution is
by Neumark et al. (2004). They report evidence for a negative employment spillover for
workers with a wage just above the minimum level.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the sparse literature on employment spillovers
by investigating employment effects along the entire wage distribution. In particular,
our contribution is threefold. First of all, we are able to analyse employment effects
in a context where the minimum wage bites very hard: the roofing sector in Germany.
Its minimum wage was introduced in 1997 and was subsequently raised several times.
With a Kaitz Index, i.e. the ratio of the minimum wage level and the median wage,
that is around 1 in eastern Germany, the bite has to be considered exceptional even by
international standards (Machin et al. 2003, Dolton and Bondibene 2011). The German
roofing sector, thus, is an ideal setting to study employment effects along the entire wage
distribution since its bite is likely to render indirect employment effects for workers above
the minimum wage.
Secondly, we are able to exploit a natural experiment since, for institutional reasons,
the minimum wage was introduced only in parts of the construction sector including the
roofing sector. Uncovered, yet comparable, sub-sectors may thus serve as a benchmark
for the counterfactual development in the roofing sector in order to derive the average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) with respect to the chances of remaining employed
in the roofing sector. Since the entire construction sector experienced a dramatic decline
in demand after the end of the unification boom in the mid 1990s that almost halved the
workforce in Eastern Germany, this is a highly relevant employment outcome.
Thirdly, we contrast the ATT from an intersectoral comparison with an ATT derived
from a comparison of workers with and without a binding MW within the roofing sector.
Under a number of identifying assumptions, a deviation between these ATTs may hint
at employment spillovers within the roofing sector. In order to make such spillovers
visible, we then combine both identification strategies. For this purpose, we estimate
the counterfactual wage that workers of the control sector would receive in the roofing
ingsworth (1981), and Neumark and Wascher (1994) for the substitution between skill groups, and Hsing
(2000) for substitution between part-time and full-time work.
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sector given their characteristics. This enables a comparison of workers with and without
a binding MW across sectors and also allows for estimating the employment effects along
the entire wage distribution.
Finally, we make use of two administrative linked-employer-employee panels one of
which contains the full sample of workers in the roofing sector over the observation pe-
riod of interest. Hence, we are able to take account of unobserved heterogeneity at the
individual level, which may be relevant if employers mainly substitute workers along un-
observable skills as was suggested by Fairris and Bujanda (2008). Our paper, thus, yields
much broader insights into the employment effects of minimum wages than most previous
studies.
The findings indicate that the chances to remain employed in the roofing sector have
deteriorated due to the minimum wage introduction, especially in eastern Germany where
the bite of the MW was particularly hard. However, the impact suggested by comparing
workers with and without a binding MW appears to be underestimated compared to
the intersectoral comparison, thus hinting at employment spillovers. An intersectoral
comparison suggests negative employment outcomes for east German workers along the
entire wage distribution. According to personal interviews with sector insiders, capital-
labour substitution rather than scale effects drive this finding. Our results highlight the
need for a broader perspective on the employment impact of minimum wages and also put
doubts on any attempt to identify employment effects of minimum wages by comparing
workers with and without a binding MW within a covered sector.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains information on the German
roofing sector, the introduction of the minimum wage and discusses some expectations for
the empirical estimations given its market structure. Section 3 describes the data basis
before Section 4 discusses the bite of the minimum wage. Section 5 describes the general
difference-in-differences estimation framework for the identification of employment effects
that is applied to different treatment and control groups in Sections 6 and 7. Section 8
concludes.
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2 The German Roofing Sector
Market structure. The goods and services that are provided by the roofing sector
encompass the roofing of new buildings as well as the mending of old roofs. Roofing is
a traditional craft in Germany requiring a master craftsman’s diploma in order to start
a business.3 These traditional roofing companies usually employ less than ten employees
and provide their services regionally and mainly to private home owners whose demand
may be rather inelastic given the few available and mainly illegal substitutes such as
moonlighting. In a survey among 250 roofing companies in 2011, more than three quar-
ters of all companies considered quality rather than prices to be the main dimension of
competition (Aretz et al. 2011). For those companies with more than 30 employees, which
constitute less than 10%, however, price competition may be more relevant since they tend
to work for public contractors and are active beyond regional boundaries.4
Moreover, in contrast to most sectors that have been studied extensively in the MW
literature, the roofing sector has a rather high level of qualification and is not very labour
intensive. More than 95% of all workers work fulltime, and a relatively high share of
around three quarters has at least a vocational training degree.5 Moreover, labour costs
account for less than 40% of total costs only (Cost Structure Survey 2001), and technical
advances regarding materials and roofing techniques appear to be quite important as
reported by roofing companies in a number of qualitative interviews.6
Business cycle. The entire construction sector experienced a boom period in the early
1990s due to German reunification but began to shrink from the mid 1990s on, see Figure
1. In eastern Germany, this post-unification downturn was much more dramatic than
in western Germany and reduced the construction sector’s revenues in the subsequent
3As an exception, it is not required to hold such a diploma if someone works as an itinerant worker.
Such workers tend to work alone and mainly provide mending services only.
4Information on company size is based on the BA data (see Section 3 for details).
5The part-time information is taken from the Cost Structure Survey for 2001 (Kostenstrukturerhe-
bung), which is released by the German Statistical Office. The share of qualified workers is calculated
based on the BA data (see Section 3 for details).
6Ten qualitative interviews with roofing companies and four additional interviews with representatives
of the trade union and the employer’s association were conducted within a report prepared for the Federal
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, see Aretz et al. (2011) for details.
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years by more than half. After 2004, all construction sectors reinstalled revenue levels in
western Germany similar to the early 1990s, while the recovery in eastern Germany was
rather marginal. Compared with structural engineering, the roofing sector and other sub-
construction sectors such as plumbing, glazing and painting services experienced a less
dramatic decline in the demand for their services in the mid 1990s and a faster recovery
after 2004. The demand for sub-construction work hinges on the demand for new buildings
as well as the age structure of the existing stock of houses with the latter apparently having
a smoothing impact on the business cycle compared to structural engineering.
Figure 1: Overall revenues in western and eastern Germany by sector, 1994 - 2009
Source: Revenue tax statistics, German Federal Statistical Office
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Moreover, sub-construction sectors broadened their portfolio during the last years,
thereby stabilising the demand for their services. In particular, roofing companies are in-
creasingly involved in the assembling of photovoltaic cells as well as the ex post insulation
of old roofs.7 The plumbers and, to a lesser extent, glaziers and painters also benefited
from this development. At least in western Germany, this has presumably contributed to a
faster recovery in the roofing and the plumbing sector compared to other sub-construction
sector and structural engineering.
Minimum wage regulations. Apart from shrinking demand, additional pressures in
the mid 1990s stemmed from the introduction of a free movement of labour that allowed
eastern European firms to send workers to German construction sites while paying home
7Both of these developments have been boosted by government initiatives for subsidising solar energy
generation since 2000 (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) and energy-saving renovations since 2002 (Ener-
getische Gebäudesanierung).
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country wages. In order to protect German workers, legally binding minimum wages that
had to be paid to all workers on German construction sites irrespective of the origin of
their contract were introduced in the structural engineering and some sub-construction
sectors. Since minimum wages are negotiated separately for certain sub-divisions of the
construction sector, not all sub-divisions agreed on minimum wage regulation, result-
ing in a coexistence of quite comparable sectors with a legally binding minimum wage
(e.g. structural engineering and roofing sector since 1997; painting sector since 2003) and
sectors such as glazing and plumbing services that are not subject to a legally binding
minimum wage until now. Hence, these sectors may potentially serve as a benchmark for
the counterfactual development in the roofing sector in the absence of a legally binding
minimum wage.
The minimum wage in the roofing sector applies to all blue-collar workers of any roof-
ing company or roofing branch within a larger company who are at least 18 years of
age, who are not an apprentice and who are not working as a custodial worker. Thus,
all white-collar workers such as office clerks as well as certain parts of the blue-collar
workforce are exempted from the minimum wage regulation. Introduced in October 1997,
the minimum wage was subsequently raised several times and was even interrupted by
short periods without any legally binding minimum wages, see Figure 2. These inter-
ruptions reflect the fact that the minimum wage is negotiated between the responsible
trade union (IG Bau) and the association of employers in the roofing sector (Zentralver-
band des Deutschen Dachdeckerhandwerks) as a part of the general collective bargaining
agreement. When these agreements expire, there may be short interruptions before a new
agreement is reached. Because the continuation of a minimum wage was not subject to
any debate since its introduction, roofing companies could, however, expect a new mini-
mum wage agreement, rendering any behavioural adjustments during these interruptions
very unlikely. Moreover, minimum wages were harmonised between western and eastern
Germany in 2003 despite wages in western Germany exceeding wages in eastern Germany
by about 25%. This results in an extremely hard bite of the minimum wage in eastern
Germany as we will see in Section 4.
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Figure 2: Minimum wage level in the German roofing sector by region, 1995-2010
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Taking all this evidence together, the roofing sector’s market structure suggests a
rather limited impact of minimum wages on employment given its limited labour intensity,
the ability of roofing companies to at least absorb some of additional costs by raising
prices and the fact that technical advances and increases in productivity offer options
for cushioning rising labour costs. At the same time, however, the lower wage floor
was fixed on a rather high level (see also section 4), particularly in eastern Germany, thus
rendering employment effects likely. Moreover, changes in relative input prices may create
incentives for substituting labour by capital and/or less skilled by skilled workers. Finally,
the minimum wage in the roofing sector was introduced during a period of economic
downturn and a shrinking market size. This strongly reduced the sector’s workforce (see
Appendix A), although the number of companies even slightly increased at the same time
as the share of single-person companies jumped from 8% in 1995 to 23% in 2010. With
the number of unemployed workers with sector-specific human capital queuing for jobs
on a rise, the bargaining power of those still working in the sector may have come under
pressure.
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3 Administrative Linked Employer-Employee Data
For our analysis, we are able to exploit two administrative linked employer-employee
panel data sets: (1) data that is collected by the central pay office of the roofing sector
(Lohnausgleichskasse, LAK ), in short the LAK data, and (2) data that is collected by the
Federal Labour Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA) for all employees that are subject
to social insurance contributions, in short the BA data.
3.1 LAK Data
In order to balance out the seasonal fluctuation of the sector, all roofing companies have
to pay an insurance premium to the LAK that is related to the total payroll of their
blue-collar workers. Therefore, they are obliged to give a monthly record to the central
pay office of the roofing sector. For our analysis, we have access to the full sample of
blue-collar workers on a monthly basis for the years 1995 to 2010, thus covering both
the pre- and post-minimum wage period. Information on monthly working hours and
monthly gross wage allows for calculating the hourly gross wage. Between October and
April, however, reported working hours need not match the true working hours because of
special regulations for cushioning the seasonal character of the sector’s activities. Hence,
we use the June information for the analysis based on the LAK data in order to avoid
such distortions and to ensure the comparability of the analysis with the BA data (see
below).
The data contains additional information only on sex and age of the workers. Since we
do not know whether someone is an apprentice or working as a custodial worker, who are
both exempted from the minimum wage regulation, we are not able to exactly identify
all covered workers. Since most custodial workers are female, however, and the share
of females among covered roofers is less than 2% according to the BA data, we exclude
women from the LAK sample. We also exclude all workers below the age of 19 and
assume that this also eliminates most uncovered apprentices. Our sample, thus, differs
from the exact coverage by missing some covered women and including some uncovered
8
apprentices in the sample. Overall, we observe a total of 1,094,609 observations between
1995 and 2010 that stem from 217,779 individuals in 22,879 firms. Note that we are able
to calculate some firm level information such as average gross pay, average firm size and
average age of the company’s workforce that we can use in addition to the individual
information.
3.2 BA Data
A major disadvantage of the LAK data is that it is only available for the roofing sector,
thus precluding any identification strategy that rests upon inter-sector comparisons. Such
an alternative identification strategy, however, becomes available based on the BA data
since it includes information for 75% of all companies in the roofing sector as well as
sub-samples of companies in other sub-construction sectors such as painting, plumbing
and glazing services for the observation period from 1994 to 2008.8 For all individuals
who are subject to social insurance contributions and work in one of these companies
on June 30th, the data contains the corresponding period of continued employment in
that company within the calender year that overlaps June 30th.9 Thus, the longest spell
encompasses the full calender year, while the shortest employment spell would be an
employment period of one day on June 30th only.
For each employment spell, we have information on age, sex, educational background,
the gross daily wage, occupation, and occupational status. Thus, the data allows for iden-
tifying covered individuals quite precisely. In particular, we are able to exclude custodial
workers, apprentices and white-collar workers as well as underage workers.10 Overall,
the sample consists of 791,910 observations in the roofing sector that stem from 172,257
covered roofers in 17,186 roofing firms and 1,557,661 observations by 354,834 workers in
8This information is taken from the Betriebshistorikdatei, a data set that aggregates the individual
data that is collected by the BA to the firm level, see Hethey-Maier and Seth (2010) for details on the
data.
9This information is taken from the employee record of the BA (Beschäftigtenmeldungen), see
e.g. Drews (2008) for details.
10We also exclude workers with a minor employment which is defined as earning below the social
insurance contribution threshold of 400e per month because these workers are included in the data only
after 1998. For comparability reasons, we also dropped such workers in the LAK data.
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35,250 firms from other sub-construction sectors who fulfill the same criteria.
Since the data only distinguishes between full-time and part-time workers and includes
information on daily gross wages only, the main restriction of the BA data refers to
the corresponding lack of information on hourly gross wages. As a remedy, we impute
the hourly gross wage by estimating the observed hourly gross wage in the LAK data
as a function of explanatory variables that are available in both data sets. For this
purpose, we first adjust the LAK data to have a similar data structure as the BA data
by creating employment spells for each individual who has worked on June 30th. For
these spells, both data sets provide information on or allow for computing the length
of the spell, the beginning of the spell, the daily gross wage, dummies for part-time
or full-time employment, individual information on sex and age as well as a number of
firm-level information such as firm size, workforce composition, and average gross daily
wage. Using all these explanatory variables and allowing for additional heterogeneity by
estimating the wage model separately for each year, eastern and western Germany as well
as for workers of different quintiles of the daily gross wage distribution, we are able to
explain 88% of the variation in hourly gross wages in the LAK data. We then use these
estimates for predicting the hourly wage in the BA data. The quality of this imputation
not only hinges on the R2 of the wage estimation, but also depends on the comparability
of the LAK and the BA sample and explanatory variables. Appendix B shows that the
imputed and observed wage distribution are very comparable. As a result, the average
predicted mean wage for full-time workers of 13.26e and 9.94e in the BA data in western
and eastern Germany, respectively, comes very close to the observed average wage in the
LAK data with 13.22e for western Germany and 9.85e for eastern Germany.
4 The Minimum Wage and Its Bite
Table 1 displays several indicators of the bite of the minimum wage (MW) for the June
preceding the introduction of a new MW regulation within the next year. In particular,
we look at the share of covered workers for whom the upcoming MW is binding due to
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earning a wage below the minimum in the June preceding the new MW regulation.11
We also show the average wage increase these workers would have to receive in case of
full compliance with the upcoming MW. This individual wage gap for a worker i with a
binding MW in period t is thereby defined as follows:
wage gapit =
MWi,t+1 − wit
wit
, (1)
where wit represents the workers hourly wage and MWi,t+1 the upcoming MW. We con-
trast this wage gap to their actual wage increase within the next year and the actual
wage increase during the same time period among workers for whom the MW was not
binding. We complement this information by the Kaitz-Index, i.e. the ratio between the
MW level and the median wage in the sector. Note that the indicators may slightly under-
estimate the bite of the MW due to the fact that the hourly wage may contain overtime
compensation that is not subject to the MW.12
The indicators based on the LAK data allow for several interesting insights. First of all,
the share of covered workers for whom the MW was binding by the time of its introduction
was as low as 1.3% in western Germany compared to 12.5% in eastern Germany. While
this share rose up to 5% in western Germany until 2008, around 50% of all eastern workers
earned below the upcoming MW at that time, a share that clearly exceeds the impact
level that Machin et al. (2003) considered a hard biting MW. This extreme bite results
from the introduction of a common MW level in both parts of the country in 2002. Since
then, the MW level approximately corresponds to the median wage in eastern Germany
so that the Kaitz-Index ranges around 100%. Even in western Germany, the Kaitz-Index
still ranges between two thirds and three quarters of the median wage. Compared to
Dolton and Bondibene (2011), who find the Kaitz-Index to range between 30% and 70%
in a survey among 22 OECD countries, the bite of the MW in the roofing sector, at least
11We do not adjust for nominal wage changes between the two dates of comparison because the inter-
mediate time span is mostly quite short.
12On average, overtime hours account for 6% of the working hours in June and, thus, may lead to
an estimated hourly wage that is up to 1.6% too high depending on the applied overtime compensation
scheme ranging from no additional compensation to a markup of 25%. Since we do not know which scheme
is applied, we left the data uncorrected as the resulting imprecision appears to be rather marginal.
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Table 1: Indicators of the minimum wage bite measured in June prior to the next MW
regulation, LAK and BA data
Workers with a binding MW?
Yes No
New MW regulation MW Share Share Wage gapa ∆ Wageb ∆ Wageb Kaitz
takes effect on (in Euro) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) (in %) Index
LAK BA LAK LAK LAK LAK
Western Germany
01.10.97 8.2 1.3 2.4 11.0 7.2 2.3 64.7
01.09.01 9.0 1.5 3.9 8.7 6.8 1.4 67.2
01.03.03 9.0 1.5 3.4 8.9 6.0 2.4 67.2
01.04.04 9.3 2.2 4.8 8.1 5.7 1.4 68.4
01.05.05 9.7 2.9 5.8 8.5 4.9 0.6 70.3
01.01.06 10.0 4.4 6.9 7.9 4.9 1.1 72.6
01.01.07 10.0 4.6 7.5 8.1 6.7 3.2 72.7
01.01.08 10.2 5.4 8.2 6.7 5.3 2.2 73.1
01.01.09 10.4 4.9 7.5 6.6 8.1 3.0 73.4
Eastern Germany
01.10.97 7.7 12.5 11.5 9.7 6.7 0.0 82.0
01.09.01 8.4 14.2 12.0 3.9 4.6 0.6 89.2
01.03.03 9.0 34.1 23.3 4.2 4.1 0.1 95.0
01.04.04 9.3 44.1 28.7 3.8 4.1 0.3 97.9
01.05.05 9.7 46.9 33.5 4.3 4.0 0.1 99.2
01.01.06 10.0 55.5 40.8 4.1 4.0 0.1 100.2
01.01.07 10.0 45.5 28.1 1.6 1.9 0.9 99.6
01.01.08 10.2 53.5 32.1 2.6 3.3 1.3 100.7
01.01.09 10.4 50.0 28.9 2.4 3.3 0.7 99.9
a Wage gap refers to equation (1)
b ∆ wage corresponds to the actual observed percentage wage change (wit+1−wit)/wit
between the June preceding and the June following the new MW regulation.
in eastern Germany, is thus extremely hard.
We also observe that the MW has been effective, i.e. actual wage increases among
workers with a binding MW exceeded the wage increases among workers for whom the
MW was not binding. While the change in the west German wage distribution is rather
marginal, the wage compression in eastern Germany results in a huge spike of workers
whose wages range around the MW level, see Figure 3. Finally, note that despite these
actual increases, they still fall short of the increases workers would have had to receive
in case of full compliance, especially in western Germany during the initial years after
the MW introduction. The improved compliance with the MW regulation during the
last years might be due to stronger controls after 2006 according to interviews that we
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Figure 3: Kernel densities of hourly gross wages in eastern and western Germany, 1995
and 2008, LAK data
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conducted with sector insiders.
Table 1 also contrasts the share of workers with a binding MW based in the LAK
data to the corresponding share based on the imputation in the BA data. In contrast to
the LAK data, however, the share of workers with a binding MW follows a probabilistic
concept because we do not only impute the mean wage prediction for each individual
but also the corresponding distribution that results from the unexplained variance and
the variance of the estimated parameters. Assuming this distribution to be normally
distributed, we are then able to calculate the probability that the wage of a worker falls
below the MW level which we denote by PMW . For the BA data, Table 1 thus reports
the average predicted probability of being affected by a binding MW among all covered
workers.
As we can see, the resulting share of workers with a binding MW resembles the LAK
patterns but differs in levels, especially for eastern Germany in the last years. In fact,
imputing the probability of being affected by a binding MW in the LAK data, gave very
similar deviations to the observed share of workers with a binding MW. Hence, it is
apparently the extreme wage compression that leads to the asymmetric form of the wage
distribution in Figure 3 and, thus, to a systematic underestimation of the share of workers
with a binding MW in eastern Germany, see Appendix C for further explanation.
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Despite the large bite of the minimum wage, especially demonstrated by the high
wage compression in Eastern Germany, the overall labour cost burden is still modest for
two reasons. First, even in the case of full compliance with respect to the minimum
wage regulations, total labour costs only increased by 1% in Western Germany and 2.5%
in Eastern Germany on average during the observed time period. Second, labour costs
amount to less than 40% of total costs, so that the change in average total costs varies
across time between 0.2-0.5% in Western Germany and 0.3-0.8% in Eastern Germany.
However, despite the low impact on total costs on average, some firms may well be affected
more strongly. Moreover, the cost burden may cumulate over time due to the gradual
increase in the minimum wage level.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that individuals with a binding MW clearly differ
between western and eastern Germany. While the average worker with a binding MW in
eastern Germany does not differ much from an average worker without a binding MW, the
average worker with a binding MW in western Germany rather corresponds to a marginal
worker with below average human capital, short tenure and part-time employment in
firms with a skill and wage level below average, see Table 2.
Table 2: Characteristics of workers in western and eastern Germany by binding status,
BA data 1995-2008
Western Germany Eastern Germany
MW for workers is binding? Yes No Yes No
Individual characteristics
Worker with voc. training deg. (in %) 24.1 67.2 70.2 80.4
Workers without voc. training (in %) 34.5 31.1 25.2 19.0
Part-time workers (in %) 41.3 1.7 4.6 0.5
Previous work exp. in sector (in years) 2.2 4.3 2.9 3.6
Previous tenure in firm (in years) 1.9 3.7 2.2 3.0
Firm characteristics
Average firm size 4.0 6.2 5.7 7.8
Firm’s share of skilled workers (in % ) 63.1 83.1 79.9 82.2
Firm’s mean daily gross wage (in Euro) 51.78 72.33 50.43 56.08
Number of observations 15,523 485,640 39,960 196,981
Note: Workers with PMW > 0.5 are considered to be bound by the MW.
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5 General Framework for the Identification of Em-
ployment Effects
Since the minimum wage was introduced for the entire sector at the same time, a strategy
for the identification of the minimum wage impact cannot rest on regional variation as
has been done in many US studies (among others Dube et al. 2007 and 2010 and Card
and Krueger 1994 and 2000). Exploiting the existing variation in the minimum wage level
between eastern and western Germany in the mid 1990s is also not advisable since the
business cycle after the reunification boom differed between both parts of the country, see
Figure 1.
Thus, there are mainly two potential approaches available for the identification of
employment effects. Either one exploits the variation in treatment intensity within the
roofing sector by comparing workers with and without a binding MW, or one uses a sub-
construction sector that is not covered by a minimum wage regulation but is as similar
as possible to the roofing sector. To see why and under which assumptions these control
groups allow for an estimation of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), let eit
denote the employment status in period t for an individual i. In particular, let eit+1 = 1
in case of being employed in the same sector as in the previous period and eit+1 = 0
otherwise, an outcome measure that we are able to observe in both the LAK and the BA
data.
This outcome measure is of main interest in a market context that is dominated by a
shrinking market size and a corresponding reduction in employment since the mid 1990s,
compare Appendix A. The question of whether someone was able to keep his job in
this market context given the additional cost pressures of the minimum wage is of main
concern. Note, however, that this outcome should not be equated with effects on the
total employment in the roofing sector. As an example, additional market entries by
single person companies are not captured by this employment outcome.
With this outcome measure in mind, denote the group of treated individuals as g1 and
the group not treated as g0. Let the minimum wage be introduced in t∗ with t0 < t∗ < t1.
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Note that all years prior to 1997 measure the ex-ante situation t0, while observations for
the ten observable years after 1997 measure the ex-post situation t1 because the employ-
ment outcome in the following June, eit+1, is already influenced by the MW introduction
in October 1997 for workers observed in June 1997. For the ex-post situation, we either
get an estimate for E[eit+1|g1, t1] or E[eit+1|g0, t1]. The average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT), θ, can now be estimated by assuming that the difference in employment
outcomes between t0 and t1 was the same for both groups in the absence of the treat-
ment. Moreover, we need to assume that the treatment does not indirectly affect the
control group, for example, via substitution effects. In this case, the causal impact θ is
given by the difference-in-differences (DiD) estimator
E[eit+1|g1, t1]− E[eit+1|g1, t0]− (E[eit+1|g0, t1]− E[eit+1|g0, t0]) = θ. (2)
In order to relax the assumption that the control group captures the counterfactual em-
ployment outcome, we can also estimate the DiD effect within a regression framework
that controls for observable differences across both groups. Since the outcome measure
calls for a non-linear analysis, we use a Logit estimation with
P (eit+1 = 1) = Λ[αg + γt + δDit + βXit + it] (3)
where αg captures the time constant difference between both groups, γt captures the
change across time that is common to both groups, and X corresponds to a set of control
variables. Dit is the treatment indicator with Dit = 1 for individuals of group g1 for the
period t > t∗, i.e. for the treatment group after treatment has taken place, and Dit = 0
otherwise. Note that neither the coefficient forDit nor its odds ratio capture the treatment
effect of interest due to the non-linearity of the estimator. Following Puhani (2008), we
estimate the marginal effect of δ to derive the treatment effect of interest θ by using the
following formula:
θ = ME(δ) = Λ[αg + γt + δDit + βxˆ]− Λ[αg + γt + βxˆ], (4)
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where xˆ indicates that we calculate the marginal effect for the average individual
observed in the sample. In particular, we add covariates that may affect employment
outcomes and could potentially be related to the treatment indicator such as sex, age,
education, occupational status, and work experience in the sector and in the company as
well as some firm characteristics such as size, the composition of the workforce, and mean
wage level. By including these firm characteristics, we control for the fact that unpro-
ductive workers may be selected into less productive and thus less well-paying companies
that differ with regard to employment chances irrespective of the minimum wage.
In addition, selection on unobservables may be relevant. If, for example, employers
mainly dismiss the most unproductive workers for a given type of qualification and expe-
rience, not controlling for this would upward bias our estimates. Due to the longitudinal
nature of our data, we can mitigate this problem by allowing for individual-specific time-
constant effects. Note, however, that one cannot calculate the marginal effect of interest
for a Fixed Effects Logit Estimator because the fixed effects are not identified in this
model framework (Wooldridge, 2002). Moreover, the Fixed Effects Logit Estimator only
uses the sub-sample of the observations for which we observe a change in the outcome
across time. This is problematic since we find evidence that the conditional sample de-
pends on the treatment, thereby biasing the estimates. Hence, we estimate a simple linear
fixed effects model, thereby avoiding the non-linear complications. We find that in most
cases, only very few observations have predictions outside the plausible range. Moreover,
pooled Logit and pooled OLS estimates also turned out to be quite similar. We, thus,
report linear fixed effects results whenever individual fixed effects seem necessary.
6 Average employment effects
In this section, we apply the general framework introduced in the latter section to the
intersectoral comparison (Section 6.1) and the comparison within the roofing sector (Sec-
tion 6.2). As we will see, the comparison of both approaches yields first insights into
possible spillover effects. In Section 7, we will then explicitly look at spillovers in the
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roofing sector by separately running the intersectoral comparison for workers with and
without a binding MW as well as for workers falling in different wage deciles. This is
feasible because we are able to identify comparable workers within the control sector.
6.1 Intersectoral comparison
Approach. A feasible control sector needs to capture the counterfactual change in em-
ployment outcomes for roofers in the absence of the minimum wage. For this to be a
plausible assumption, the control sector should have a comparable market structure as
well as comparable demand conditions. Among the sub-construction sectors without a
legally binding minimum wage - the plumbing and the glazing sector13 - the plumbing
sector is preferable for a number of reasons. According to Figure 1, the business cycle in
the plumbing rather than the glazing sector resembles the business cycle in the roofing
sector. In fact, for western Germany demand conditions almost follow the same path,
while in eastern Germany the demand for plumbing services started to drop somewhat
earlier than in the roofing sector, a deviation that we will return to in the robustness
analysis.
Moreover, the plumbing sector is similar to the roofing sector with regard to important
market indicators that moderate the potential impact of a minimum wage, see Table 3.14
In particular, roofing and plumbing companies are similarly sized in terms of both the
number of employees and the revenues generated. Also, the value added is highest in
the roofing sector, closely followed by the plumbing sector. Moreover, the glazing sector
is more labour-intensive and invests almost twice as much per employee than the other
sectors while the average gross daily wage is quite comparable across all sectors. Finally,
the number of companies per one million euro of revenues in the sector, a measure of the
degree of competition, is almost identical in the roofing and plumbing sector but much
lower in the glazing sector, suggesting less competition.
Therefore, we consider the plumbing sector as a suitable and better benchmark for the
13The painting sector introduced a MW in 2003.
14We display the pre-minimum wage indicators for 1996 wherever it is available as the basis for judging
the usefulness of a sector as a benchmark for the roofing sector.
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Table 3: Comparison of the roofing, the glazing, and the plumbing sector by various
economic indicators
Roofers Plumbers Glaziers Source
Number of companies 11,295 37,720 3,752 A, 1996
Number of employees 113,996 364,393 25,393 A, 1996
Avg. number of employees per company 8.8 9.0 6.6 A, 1996
Share of firms by revenues (in 1,000) B, 1996
< 100 DM 6.8 8.8 13.6
100-500 DM 24.6 33.7 42.6
500-1, 000 DM 26.1 23.5 21.5
1, 000-2, 000 DM 25.1 19.3 13.5
> 2, 000 DM 17.4 14.6 8.5
Value added in e per employee 37,195 35,949 32,931 C, 2001
Investments/employee (in e) 1,472 1,229 2,482 C, 2001
Share of labour costs (in %) 36.0 32.5 49.0 C, 2001
Avg. gross daily wage/fulltime employee (in e) 61.25 63.23 64.28 A, 1996
Number of companies/1 Mio. sector revenue 1.3 1.3 0.6 B, 1996
Note: A - BA data (see Section 3); B - Revenue tax statistics of the German Federal Statistical Office
(Umsatzsteuerstatistik); C - Cost Structure Survey of the German Federal Statistical Office (Kosten-
strukturerhebung)
roofing sector than the glazing sector. For the intersectoral comparison, the treatment
group g1, thus, corresponds to all workers of the roofing sector that are covered by the
minimum wage regulations, while workers in the plumbing sector, who would have been
covered if they worked in the roofing sector, are considered as the control group g0. Hence,
this approach can only be estimated based on the BA data. Treatment now refers to being
covered by the minimum wage regulations and the resulting estimates give us the average
employment effect for covered workers in the roofing sector if changes in employment
outcomes of plumbers between the ex-ante situation (t0 : 1994-1996) and the ex-post
situation (t1 : 1997-2007) capture the counterfactual change in employment outcomes for
roofers in the absence of the minimum wage.
Moreover, we need to assume that there is no control group contamination, i.e. there is
no indirect effect of the minimum wage regulations in the roofing sector on the plumbing
sector. If the plumbing sector provides some substitutes for roofing services, for example, a
negative employment effect in the roofing sector would boost employment in the plumbing
sector, thereby overestimating a negative impact of the minimum wage. However, the lack
of any evident improvement in the revenues realised by the plumbing sector relative to
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the roofing sector after the MW introduction puts doubt on such spillovers, see Figure 1.
Moreover, we find that transitions between both sectors are negligible and independent
from the MW introduction. Both before and after 1997, only about 0.2% (0.1%) of all
roofers (plumbers) enter the plumbing sector (roofing sector) in the next year.
Results. Descriptives regarding both the dependent variable and the set of covariates
for both roofers and plumbers prior to and after the minimum wage introduction are
provided in Appendix D. On average, 80% (77%) of all western (eastern) German roofers
are still employed in the same sector after one year. The unconditional DiD of the
dependent variable for the intersectoral comparison corresponds to 3 percentage points
for western and −1 percentage point for eastern Germany. However, the DiD controlling
for observable characteristics across sectors suggests some relevant changes in observables
such as a relative increase in skilled workers in the roofing sector that needs to be controlled
for in a regression approach. For the regression approach, Dit in equation (3) equals one
for all roofers in the period after the minimum wage introduction (t1 : 1997-2007).
Table 4 shows the marginal effect of Dit from equation (4) for the average worker in
eastern and western Germany. As previously discussed, we compare estimates from a
pooled logit and a pooled linear probability model and compare this to estimates from a
linear probability model that takes account of individual-specific fixed effects. Irrespective
of the specification, the minimum wage in eastern Germany appears to have reduced the
chances for roofers to remain employed in the sector by around 2 to 3 percentage points
on average compared to plumbers who have not been subject to minimum wage regula-
tions. Adding firm-level covariates in column 2 compared to a specification that includes
individual covariates only, does not have much influence on the estimated impact. More-
over, both the pooled Logit model and the pooled LPM yield quite similar results and,
with only 0.4% of all observations falling outside the admissible range, the LPM estimator
performs quite well. Controlling for time-constant unobservables at the individual level
(column 4) yields very comparable results although the share of observations outside the
[0; 1] interval rises to still acceptable, albeit higher, 9.0%.
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Table 4: Minimum wage effect on the probability of being employed in the roofing sector
in the next year, intersectoral comparison based on BA data 1994-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled Logit Pooled Logit Pooled LPM FE LPM
Eastern Germany
ME of Dit in ppa -2.0*** -2.2*** -2.3*** -2.9***
Robust s.e. (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3)
Obs. (in 1000) 497 497 497 497
Share of Yˆ /∈ [0; 1] n/a n/a 0.4% 9.0%
Individual covariatesb Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-level covariatesc No Yes Yes Yes
Western Germany
ME of Dit in ppa 2.0*** 1.8*** 1.2*** -1.2***
Robust s.e. (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Obs. (in 1000) 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,110
Share of Yˆ /∈ [0; 1] n/a n/a 0.9% 0.4%
Individual covariatesb Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-level covariatesc No Yes Yes Yes
a Marginal effect of Dit in percentage points; for logit estimations calculated as in
equation (4)
b Occupational status and educational attainment (6 dummies) in the fixed effects
estimations plus age, age2, sex, 2nd order polynomial of previous work experience in
the sector and in the company in the pooled estimations
c Age and qualification of company workforce, company size (4 dummies), 2nd order
polynomial of mean daily gross wage
Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%, *** 0.1%
In western Germany, the impact appears to be similarly robust when controlling for
firm-level in addition to individual covariates. Both specifications indicate a positive min-
imum wage effect for roofers as compared to plumbers of around 2 percentage points.
Also the pooled LPM model suggests a positive minimum wage effect, which is slightly
lower than for the pooled logit models. However, when controlling for time-constant
unobservable characteristics in the FE LPM specification, the findings for western Ger-
many indicate that the chances for a roofer to remain employed in the next year after
the minimum wage was introduced decrease by around 1 percentage point compared to
plumbers who have not been subject to minimum wage regulations. This suggests that
minimum wages in western Germany increased layoffs mainly among workers with poor
unobservable characteristics so that pooled estimations are upward biased.
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Robustness. The validity of the previous results critically hinges on the common trends
assumption. Unfortunately, we only have three years prior to the MW introduction in
order to examine the pre-treatment trend in employment outcomes. For eastern Germany,
Appendix D suggests a dip in employment chances in the roofing sector in 1996 that
deviates from the trend in the plumbing sector. Indeed, placebo tests in Appendix E
confirm the common trend assumption between 1994 and 1995, while there are significant
deviations between 1995 and 1996. The decline in employment outcomes in 1996 may hint
at anticipation effects since employment outcomes for the last pre-MW year are measured
just three months prior to the MW introduction in October 1997. Excluding observations
for 1996, however, suggests even somewhat stronger negative effects, see Table 5. If the
dip in 1996 does not result from an anticipation effect, we should, however, not exclude
this year but adjust our estimates for diverging trends. A corresponding extension of
the previous estimation that allows for diverging trends across sectors mainly supports
the previous findings with only the pooled LPM estimates deviating from the previous
estimates. For western Germany, Appendix D suggests that there was a dip in employment
outcomes for roofers relative to plumbers in 1995. Thus, compared to plumbers, the
placebo tests suggest a less favourable trend for roofers between 1994 and 1995 but a
positive trend from 1995 to 1996, see Appendix E. Estimations that allow for diverging
trends across sectors, however, confirm the previous findings, see Table 5.
Adjusting for diverging trends based on the few pre-MW years, however, may not
suffice if the common trends assumption fails in the long run. As some tentative robustness
check, we ran estimations that were extended by interacting the treatment indicator Dit
to allow for a heterogeneous ATT for periods with distinct levels of a MW bite (1997-
2001, 2002-2004 and 2005-2007) in order to examine the timing of the effect after the MW
introduction. As shown in Table 5, the impact of the minimum wage in eastern Germany
was significantly negative in all three sub-periods. Moreover, according to the preferred
fixed-effects specification, the strongest impact occurred in the second period after the
minimum wage was raised to the level in western Germany. In western Germany, the
fixed effects specification also suggests that the minimum wage impact was strongest in
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Table 5: Marginal effect of Dit in percentage points for various robustness checks of the
intersectoral comparison in Table 4
(1) (2) (3)
Pooled Pooled FE Obs.
Logit LPM LPM (in 1000)
Eastern Germany
Sample without 1996 -3.4*** -3.6*** -3.4*** 400
Trend-adjusted DiD -2.1*** 0.7 -1.8*** 497
Extension with period-wise effects
ME of Ditxt97−01 in pp -1.3*** -1.7*** -3.1***
ME of Ditxt02−04 in pp -3.0*** -2.8*** -3.6*** 497
ME of Ditxt05−07 in pp -4.7*** -3.7*** -2.7***
Western Germany
Trend-adjusted DiD 2.6*** 1.6*** -1.2*** 1,110
Extension with period-wise effects
ME of Ditxt97−01 in pp 1.8*** 1.0*** -1.3***
ME of Ditxt02−04 in pp 1.5*** 0.7*** -1.8*** 1,110
ME of Ditxt05−07 in pp 1.8*** 1.9*** -0.6**
Note: Same specification as in Table 4 with individual and firm-level controls;
Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%, *** 0.1%
the intermediate period, followed by the period after its introduction. The smaller effect
in the last period may suggest that firms were able to bear the additional costs that were
imposed by the minimum wage during these years of economic revival in the western
German roofing sector. All in all, the estimation results appear to be quite robust and
also show a plausible impact pattern across time.
6.2 Comparison within the roofing sector
Approach. The treatment group g1 in this approach corresponds to roofers with a
binding MW due to earning a wage in June that is below the minimum wage level that
takes effect until June of the next year. For the pre-regulation years, we consider someone
to belong to the treatment group if his wage falls below the minimum wage level that
would have to be applied in the pre-regulation years given the increases of the median
nominal wage in the LAK data. Workers of the roofing sector whose wages are above that
minimum level are used as the control group g0. While we are able to exactly identify
these groups in the LAK data, we define g1 in the BA data to encompass all covered
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workers whose probability to fall below the minimum wage level exceeds 50%.15
Hence, the treatment indicator Dit equals one for all covered workers with a binding
minimum wage after the MW introduction and zero otherwise. The resulting estimates
give the average treatment effect on the treated if changes in employment outcomes for
workers without a binding MW between the ex-ante situation (t0 : 1995-1996)16 and the ex-
post situation (t1 : 1997-2007) capture the counterfactual change in employment outcomes
for the treated roofers in the absence of the minimum wage. To the extent that all
roofers are affected by the same demand conditions, this is clearly a plausible assumption.
However, for a period of 13 years that we cover in the estimations, diverging trends may
arise due to skill-biased technological advances. We will return to this potential problem in
the robustness section. Moreover, the suggested approach only yields unbiased estimates
if there are no minimum wage induced employment effects for workers without a binding
minimum wage. In fact, note that, if all identifying assumptions hold, the intersectoral
comparison and the estimate of the comparison within the roofing sector yield the same
employment effects for an average covered worker in the roofing sector.
Results. This approach can be estimated using both the BA and LAK data. Corre-
sponding descriptives for the BA data are provided in Appendix F.17 The unconditional
DiD for the probability of still being employed in the next year indicates strong positive
effects, but this raw DiD has to be interpreted with caution. Since the minimum wage
level repeatedly increased after 1998, the share of individuals with a binding MW also
increased until 2008 (see Table 4). As a consequence, the pool of workers with a binding
MW is likely to improve across time resulting in upward biased estimates. We therefore
decided to exploit the variation in the status of being affected by a binding MW across
time on the individual level by taking account of individual fixed effects. In fact, the
pooled Logit and pooled LPM model show strongly positive and comparable employment
effects that are likely to reflect the described non-comparability of the pool of workers
15A specification with PMW as a continuous treatment variable gave similar results.
16Note that we have only two pre-regulation years because the LAK data that are used for imputing
hourly wages are only available from 1995 onwards.
17Descriptives for the LAK data are available from the authors upon request.
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with a binding MW prior to and after the MW introduction. Since we do not consider
these estimates informative, Table 6 reports the estimates for the fixed effects LPM only.18
The DiD results for eastern Germany in columns (1) and (2) indicate that workers
with a binding MW were 9 to 10 percentage points less likely to remain employed after
the MW introduction relative to workers without a binding MW. This negative effect is
confirmed by both the LAK and BA data suggesting that the BA data yield quite reliable
estimates despite the imprecision in the distinction between workers with and without
a binding MW. For western Germany, the LAK data show an insignificant reduction in
the probability of continued employment by −2.7 percentage points, while the treatment
effect is slightly larger and significant at the 5% significance level when using the BA
data.19
If all identifying assumptions regarding common trends in the absence of the treatment
and the lack of any spillovers held, multiplying the ATT from the comparison of workers
with and without a binding MW within the roofing sector in Table 6 by the share of work-
ers with a binding MW should yield the ATT from the previous intersectoral comparison,
i.e. the average effect for all covered workers in the roofing sector.20 The implied ATT for
covered workers are included in Table 6. For eastern Germany, this yields an ATT for all
covered workers of −2.0(= −10.0× 0.204) percentage points for the BA results since, on
average, 20.4% of all workers in eastern Germany are affected by a binding MW across
the entire period. In western Germany, the MW is binding for 5.5% of the workforce on
average, implying an ATT for all covered workers of −0.3% percentage points. Compared
to the fixed-effects estimates in Table 4, the fixed-effects estimates in Table 6 appear to be
underestimated. Since we consider the assumptions underlying the previous intersectoral
comparison plausible given the robustness checks, this deviation either indicates that the
18As an alternative, one could evaluate each minimum wage level separately by defining workers with
and without a binding MW corresponding to each MW level. However, corresponding estimates did not
show any clear pattern, thus indicating that anticipation effects or the catching up with past increases
make it difficult to isolate the impact of subsequent MW increases.
19When including individuals with a minor employment in the LAK estimates, the treatment effect
amounts to highly significant −17.3 percentage points. For a better comparability with the BA data, we
leave these individuals out. Still, the estimates with minor employment indicate that the MW may have
had a strong effect on their employment chances, a finding that should be approached in future research.
20This is the case because the comparison within the roofing sector assumes a zero effect of the MW
for workers without a binding MW.
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Table 6: Minimum wage effect on the probability of being employed in the roofing sector
in the next year, DiD estimations between workers with and without a binding MW, BA
and LAK data 1995-2007
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DiDa DiD taDiDb DiDiDc
LAK BA BA BA
Eastern Germany
ME of Dit in ppd -8.5*** -10.0*** -8.8*** -5.6***
Robust s.e. (0.7) (0.8) (1.1) (1.2)
Obs. (in 1000) 288 224 224 446
Share of Yˆ /∈ [0; 1] 7.3% 8.6% 4.0% 6.9%
ATT for all covered workers -1.7 -2.0 -1.8 -1.1
Western Germany
ME of Dit in ppd -2.7 -5.0* -0.8 -7.2*
Robust s.e. (2.3) (2.0) (2.5) (2.9)
Obs. (in 1000) 601 457 457 1,013
Share of Yˆ /∈ [0; 1] 0.1% 0.9% 0.1% 3.6%
ATT for all covered workers -0.1 -0.3 -0.04 -0.4
a DiD estimation for workers with and without a binding MW within the
roofing sector
b Trend-adjusted DiD estimation for workers with and without a binding
MW within the roofing sector
c DiDiD estimation for workers with and without a binding MW within the
roofing sector compared to the plumbing sector
d Marginal effect in percentage points for the treatment indicator Dit from
a linear probability model with individual fixed effects; all estimations
include individual and firm level covariates as in Table 4 for the BA data
and the same covariates except educational attainment for the LAK data.
Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%, *** 0.1%
common trend assumption between workers with and without a binding MW is violated
and/or that workers without a binding MW must be indirectly and negatively affected
by the MW.
Robustness. In order to rule out that the observed deviation between the ATT from
both estimation approaches results from a violation of the common trends assumption
between workers with and without a binding MW, we need to test the robustness of this
assumption. Therefore, we examine placebo tests for the two years that are available prior
to the MW introduction, see Appendix E. While the placebo test confirms the common
trend for western Germany, the placebo test for eastern Germany is insignificant only
for the LAK data but suggests a diverging trend based on the BA data despite the fact
that estimation results were quite comparable across data sets. Surprisingly, however,
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allowing for diverging trends between workers with and without a binding MW does
not alter the estimation results much for eastern Germany, but suggests an insignificant
negative impact for western Germany, see column (3) in Table 6.
Since the observable pre-regulation period is, however, very short, it is questionable
to what extent placebo tests may confirm or disprove the validity of the common trends
assumption for the whole period and to what extent trend-adjusted estimations based on
this short pre-regulation period help to tackle a potential violation of this assumption.
Moreover, diverging trends in the long run due to, for example, skill-biased technological
advances might still bias our estimates.
As an alternative robustness check, we therefore capture the potentially diverging
trends in the absence of the MW between workers with and without a binding MW by
using comparable workers from the plumbing sector as an additional benchmark. In par-
ticular, we identify those plumbers for whom the minimum wage would have been binding
if they worked in the roofing sector given their individual and firm characteristics. We do
so by imputing the wage plumbers would receive in the roofing sector given their charac-
teristics, thus applying the wage imputation described in Section 3 not only to roofers but
also to plumbers and estimating the probability of being bound by the minimum wage
(PMW ) analogous to roofers. Appendix G indicates that the distribution of PMW is aston-
ishingly similar across sectors, thus indicating the similarity of both sectors with respect
to observable characteristics. Hence, if we think about the imputation of the counterfac-
tual PMW among plumbers as an approach that is similar to matching individuals with a
similar treatment intensity, the necessary common support along the whole distribution
seems to be given.
We then use plumbers with and without a counterfactually binding MW to run a
DiDiD estimation where the treatment indicator Dit equals one for workers of the roofing
sector with a binding MW after the MW introduction and zero for all other groups and
time periods. If roofers with and without a binding MW had experienced different trends
in their employment chances even in the absence of the minimum wage, reflecting, for
example, skill-biased technological progress, we assume that plumbers with and without
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a counterfactually binding MW capture these diverging trends across time. The corre-
sponding DiDiD results in column (4) of Table 6 indicate that the employment effect
in eastern Germany continues to be negative, but somewhat smaller. This may suggest
that part of the negative effect in Table 6 is in fact due to a negative trend for workers
with a binding MW relative to workers without a binding MW. Since representatives
of the roofing sector repeatedly mentioned the need for catching up with technological
progress in eastern Germany (see Aretz et al. 2011), this appears a plausible finding. For
western Germany, the difference between the DiD and DiDiD estimates are smaller and
suggest that trends in western Germany rather diverge in the opposite direction. More
importantly, we find that the implied ATT for an average covered worker is smaller than
suggested by the intersectoral comparison in the previous section. Therefore, employment
spillovers between workers with and without a binding MW remain the prime suspect for
this deviation, a hypothesis that we examine in the next section.
7 Making employment spillovers visible
Approach. The treatment group g1 corresponds to all workers of the roofing sector
who are covered by the minimum wage regulations, while workers in the plumbing sector,
who would have been covered if they worked in the roofing sector, are considered as
the control group g0. However, we do not estimate the average employment effect for
covered roofers as in the intersectoral comparison in Section 6, but allow the treatment
effect to differ by binding status. In particular, we distinguish between workers with a
binding MW (p1 = PMW > 0.5), workers with wages significantly above the minimum
level (p3 = PMW < 0.1) and an intermediate group of workers p2 for whom PMW ranges
between these extremes. Since we have estimated the counterfactual probability of earning
a wage below the MW for workers in the plumbing sector, we are thus able to extend the
DiD framework to identify the treatment effect for all three groups:
P (eit+1 = 1) = κp + αg×p + γt×p + δDit × p+ βXit + ci + it (5)
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where κp captures the time constant difference between workers of a different binding
status and αg×p captures the time constant deviation between roofers and plumbers of
the same binding status. Furthermore, γt×p allows for changes in employment outcomes
of workers with a particular binding status across time that are common to roofers and
plumbers, while the same set of covariates X as before controls for observable differences
across workers. The treatment indicator Dit equals one for covered roofers in the period
after the MW introduction (1997-2007) and zero for plumbers as well as roofers in the
ex-ante period (1995-1996). This treatment indicator is interacted with the binding status
so that we get an ATT for all three groups of workers. If spillover effects are relevant,
we should observe non-zero outcomes for workers with wages above the minimum level,
i.e. with PMW < 0.5.
Note that due to the change in the pool of workers with a particular binding status
across time (see previous section), we again use a fixed-effects linear probability model
for estimation, i.e we exploit the change in binding status across time on the individual
level for identification by including ci in equation (5). The identifying assumption is
that plumbers and roofers with the same set of covariates X and the same changes in
the binding status would experience comparable changes in employment outcomes across
time in the absence of the MW. In fact, note that this assumption is less strict than the
assumption in Section 6.1 because we condition on the binding status in addition to X.
Results. Columns (1) and (3) in Table 7 show the estimated impact of the minimum
wage on the probability of still being employed in the sector in the next year by binding
status of the worker. The outcomes for workers with a binding MW (p1) range around −9
percentage points in both eastern and western Germany. As expected from the previous
discussion, the estimated treatment effect for workers with wages above the minimum
wage level significantly differs from zero and suggests employment spillovers. For the
intermediate group (p2), the chances of remaining employed in the roofing sector are
reduced by almost 5 percentage points in eastern Germany and by almost 4 percentage
points in western Germany. Even for workers whose probability to fall below the MW is
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Table 7: Minimum wage effect on the probability of being employed in the roofing sector
in the next year, intersectoral DiD estimations by binding status, BA data 1995-2007
Eastern Germany Western Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE LPM with trend adjustment? Nob Yesc Nob Yesc
ME of Dit × p1 in ppa -8.6*** -8.5*** -8.8*** -8.4***
ME of Dit × p2 in ppa -4.8*** -4.7*** -3.7* -3.7*
ME of Dit × p3 in ppa -2.8*** -2.4*** -1.2*** -1.5**
Obs. in 1,000 446 446 1,013 1,013
Implied ATT analogue to section 6.1 -4.4 -4.1 -1.8 -2.0
a Marginal effect of the treatment in percentage points by binding status p.
b Linear DiD estimation as in equation (5); covariates X as in Table 6.
c Linear DiD estimation as in equation (5) extended by sector-specific time trends;
covariates X as in Table 6
Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%, *** 0.1%
less than 10%, we find an increased risk of leaving the roofing sector of almost 3 percentage
points in eastern Germany and around 1 percentage point in western Germany. Note that
these findings imply an ATT for an average covered roofer that is largely in line with the
estimates in Section 6.1.21 However, the effect is not only caused by workers with a
binding MW, but to a lesser extent also by workers who are not affected by a binding
MW. Therefore, the ATT for workers with a binding MW relative to workers without a
binding MW in Section 6 is downward biased.
Robustness. Note that interpreting the above cross-sector comparisons for workers
of a different binding status as evidence for employment effects for workers who earn
a wage above the minimum wage threshold rests on several assumptions. First of all,
spillovers between the sectors need to be at least negligible compared to spillovers between
workers within the roofing sector. As discussed in Section 6.1, we consider this to be a
plausible assumption given the low and quite time-constant rate of intersectoral transitions
of workers. Secondly, roofers and plumbers of a particular binding status must have
experienced a similar trend in employment outcomes in the absence of the MW. We test
for the robustness of the common trends assumption by allowing for different trends across
sectors based on the years prior to the MW introduction. The results in Table 7 suggest
21This implied ATT results from calculating the weighted ATT across the three groups of workers that
differ by binding status.
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that the trend-adjustment does not have much of an effect on the estimation results.
However, the common trends assumption could fail in the long run, and a trend-
adjustment based on two pre-regulation years may not suffice to tackle the problem. Also,
a concern with the previous estimates might be that there is some statistical uncertainty
regarding the binding status of the worker due to the imputation. In other words, even
the group that is considered to be unaffected by a binding MW (p3) still has a probability
of earning a wage below the minimum wage level of up to 10%. As a result, the previous
results might simply reflect the individuals within each group for whom the MW is in fact
binding.
In order to counteract such concerns, we conduct the previous intersectoral comparison
along the deciles of the wage distribution and distinguish between three sub-periods that
differ by bite (1997-2001; 2002-2004; 2005-2007). As an advantage, we also observe wage
deciles for which the probability of being affected by a binding MW is zero or very close
to zero, see Appendix H for corresponding descriptives. Effects on these deciles cannot
be driven by the previously mentioned measurement problem. Secondly, we are able to
examine whether the pattern of employment effects follows the extension of the bite to
higher wage deciles across time. Using again the counterfactual wage for plumbers if
they worked in the roofing sector, we thus estimate the ATTs for each wage decile by
exchanging p in equation (5) by the decile dit = 1, . . . , 10 and by further interacting
Dit × dit with the three sub-periods. Note in Appendix H that the share of plumbers
whose counterfactual wage falls in the lowest wage decile is quite high due to the wage
compression in the roofing sector. Still, we have high numbers of observations in the
plumbing sector for each wage decile in the roofing sector so that we are able to estimate
the ATT for each decile. The approach is related to the study of Neumark et al. (2004),
who also study the minimum wage effects throughout the wage distribution. Compared
to our study, the authors exploit the regional and time variation of the minimum wage
level in the UK and look at next years’ employment status along the wage distribution,
defined as the distribution of initial earnings relative to the old minimum wage.
Figure 4 displays the corresponding marginal effects on the probability of continued
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Figure 4: Minimum wage effect on the probability of being employed in the roofing sector
in the next year by decile of the wage distribution and sub-period, by Western (top) and
Eastern Germany (bottom), BA data 1995-2007
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Note: The figures only display effects that are significant at least at the 5% significance level.
employment in the roofing sector in percentage points as long as the effect is significant
at least at the 5% level. The results indicate that the prospects of continued employment
in eastern Germany have deteriorated due to the minimum wage almost along the entire
wage distribution in eastern Germany. Moreover, note that the impact on workers with
wages in the upper wage deciles are partially significant only for the latest period where
the bite of the minimum wage was strongest. For western Germany, wage deciles that
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are not affected by a binding MW appear to be less affected by the MW. For workers
whose wages fall in the 7th to 9th decile, no significant effects can be found at all. Still,
there is some evidence for employment spillovers in line with the previous results because
workers in the 3rd to 6th decile, for whom we find a decline in the chances of continued
employment, are only marginally affected by a binding MW (see Appendix H). Also,
the effect seems to follow the extended bite of the MW since wage deciles 5 and 6 are
only affected in the later periods with a higher minimum wage level. The negative effect
on continued employment of roofers in the 10th decile might be caused by voluntary
quits of predominantly master craftsmen who leave the sample by deciding to become
self-employed and to establish a single-person company whose share of all companies
markedly increased during the observation period.
This additional analysis confirms that there are relevant spillovers in eastern Germany
whose temporal pattern confirms a link to the extending minimum wage bite. For western
Germany, employment spillovers are less strong but seem to exist for workers earning
wages just above the minimum wage and for workers in the highest wage decile. These
negative employment outcomes for workers with wages above the MW allow for two not
necessarily competing explanations. On the one hand, the observed result pattern may
suggest that workers are substituted by capital and that the substitutability differs for
different types of workers with the least skilled workers being easiest to substitute. On
the other hand, the result pattern is compatible with negative scale effects that mostly,
if not for all workers, dominate a positive substitution effect between different types of
workers. Of course, both explanations may be relevant to some extent, albeit qualitative
interviews with leading experts in the roofing sector (see Aretz et al. 2011) suggest that
the first may be the dominant explanation. In particular, the insiders doubt that the
minimum wage in the roofing sector had much of a scale effect while the relevance of
technological advances such as the introduction of new roofing systems that reduce the
necessary labour input have been stressed.
The results are partly in line with Neumark et al. (2004), who find that workers whose
wages are initially close to the minimum wage (up to 1.3 times the minimum wage) are
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most likely to be affected by changes in the wage floor. However, the authors find no
evidence for spillovers in the upper part of the wage distribution, as opposed to our study.
8 Conclusion
This paper analysed the impact of minimum wages in the German roofing sector on work-
ers’ chances of continued employment. For the identification of average employment out-
comes, we contrasted the estimated minimum wage impact when comparing the chances
of continued employment in the roofing sector with a control sector and when comparing
the chances of roofers with and without a binding minimum wage. In addition, we es-
timate the causal impact of the minimum wage for workers with and without a binding
minimum wage as well as along the entire wage distribution. We are, thus, able to also
identify indirect effects of the minimum wage on workers in the upper parts of the wage
distribution for whom the MW is not binding. Our main conclusions are:
• On average, the minimum wage in the roofing sector resulted in poorer chances
of remaining employed according to both the intersectoral comparison as well as
the comparison of workers with and without a binding minimum wage within the
roofing sector. This is especially true for eastern Germany, whose minimum wage
level gave rise to a much higher share of affected workers of about 57% compared
to 12% in western Germany. Given the limited compliance with the minimum wage
regulations, the impact could even be stronger if compliance was fully enforced.
• Estimates from the comparison of workers with and without a binding minimum
wage seem to be underestimated compared to estimates from an intersectoral com-
parison. If one is willing to assume that the common trend assumption holds and
that the control sector is not affected by spillover effects, assumptions that are sup-
ported by some robustness checks, this deviation indicates that the minimum wage
also affects the employment chances of roofers who are not directly affected by a
binding minimum wage.
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• Running an intersectoral comparison of employment chances along the entire wage
distribution by exploiting the counterfactual position of workers of the control sector
in the wage distribution of the roofing sector confirms this previous suspicion. The
prospects of continued employment deteriorated due to the minimum wage along
the entire wage distribution in eastern Germany. In western Germany, spillovers are
less strong but also exist for workers just above the minimum wage level.
• The decline in employment chances among workers without a binding minimum
wage may indicate that scale effects dominate substitution effects and/or that min-
imum wages induce some capital-labour substitution. While both may be relevant
to some extent, the latter may be the dominant force according to interviews that
we conducted with sector insiders. In particular, they consider new roofing systems
as a potential means of reducing minimum-wage induced labour costs but question
a strong decline in output since the demand for roofing services appears to be rather
price-inelastic.
These findings on the impact of the minimum wage regulations on the chances of
continued employment should not, however, be equated with the overall minimum wage
impact on the sector’s employment. In particular, the single-person companies, whose
share among all companies tripled during the observation period to 23% in 2010, are
not accounted for by our analysis. Furthermore, given the specific conditions of the
roofing sector, e.g. the rather high level of qualification and the low labour intensity, a
transferability of the results to other sectors which might be subject to minimum wage
regulations in the future has to be viewed with caution.
Despite these reservations, the presented evidence clearly highlights the need for a
broader perspective on employment effects of minimum wages by also taking a closer look
at workers who do not appear to be affected by the minimum wage at a first glance. More-
over, our results put doubt on any attempts to identify employment effects of minimum
wages by comparing workers with and without a binding minimum wage within a covered
sector.
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Appendix
A - Evolution of the employment across sectors by region, year
1997=100, 1994-2008, BA data
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C - Explanation of the underestimation of the bite in the BA
data
The compressed wage distribution which is observed in Figure 3 indicates that the im-
putation technique, which we use for implementing a hourly wage in the BA data and
which assumes a normal distribution of wages, leads to a systematic underestimation of
the share of workers with a binding MW in eastern Germany. For illustration, consider
two types of workers that capture the asymmetric form of the wage distribution. Type
A’s wage roughly corresponds to the MW, whereas type B’s wage lies somewhere above
the MW level. Due to the fact that there is uncertainty which individual falls into which
category, the imputed distribution of the predicted mean wage always reflects a mixing
distribution of these two types. As a consequence, the imputed variance for type A is
an overestimation whereas type B’s imputed wage variance is an underestimation of the
true variance. As a result, too much probability mass for type A is above the MW and
too little probability mass for type B is below the MW, resulting in an underestimation
of the share of workers with a binding MW. Still, the probability of being affected by a
binding MW on an individual level should be highly related to the treatment intensity,
i.e. the higher this probability on an individual level is, the more likely is an individual to
fall below the MW threshold and the higher is the need for increasing the wage in order
to comply with the MW level.
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D - Mean values of independent and dependent variables by sec-
tor prior to and after the MW introduction
D.1 - Eastern Germany, BA data, 1994 - 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Roofers Plumbers Unconditional
before MW after MW before MW after MW DiD
1994 - 1996 1997 - 2007 1994 - 1996 1997 - 2007
Dependent variable: Employed in the same sector in June of next year
1994 0.80 0.83
1995 0.78 0.81
1996 0.75 0.81
Total 0.78 0.74 0.82 0.79 -0.01
Individual covariates
Age 34.45 35.80 36.04 38.48 -1.08
Female 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
No vocational degree 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.02
Secondary education 0.81 0.88 0.89 0.93 0.04
Tertiary education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Missing educational status 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.04 -0.02
Skilled workers 0.73 0.78 0.86 0.87 0.04
Unskilled workers 0.24 0.19 0.10 0.09 -0.04
Master craftsman 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00
Part-time <15 hours/week 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Part-time >15 hours/week 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Prev. work exp. in sector (in years) 1.95 9.20 1.95 7.14 2.05
Prev. tenure in firm (in years) 1.78 7.09 1.92 8.08 -0.85
Firm-level covariates
Share of skilled workers 0.73 0.76 0.86 0.83 0.06
Share of unskilled workers 0.24 0.19 0.10 0.09 -0.04
Mean age of workforce 34.46 36.00 36.00 38.65 -1.11
1-5 employees 0.07 0.17 0.11 0.19 0.01
6-10 employees 0.16 0.25 0.17 0.19 0.06
11-20 employees 0.32 0.29 0.22 0.20 0.00
> 20 employees 0.45 0.30 0.50 0.42 -0.07
Mean daily gross wage in firms with > 2 workers 54.95 54.91 53.32 51.66 1.62
Number of observations 75,227 172,249 73,178 176,752
Note: The unconditional DiD is computed the following way: columns (2)-(4)-((1)-(3)).
D.2 - Western Germany, BA data, 1994 - 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Roofers Plumbers Unconditional
before MW after MW before MW after MW DiD
1994 - 1996 1997 - 2007 1994 - 1996 1997 - 2007
Dependent variable: Employed in the same sector in June of next year
1994 0.81 0.87
1995 0.79 0.87
1996 0.81 0.87
Total 0.80 0.82 0.87 0.85 0.03
Individual covariates
Age 34.92 36.52 35.77 37.62 -0.25
Female 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
No vocational degree 0.26 0.22 0.06 0.07 -0.04
Secondary education 0.65 0.73 0.89 0.91 0.06
Tertiary education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Missing educational status 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.02
Skilled workers 0.61 0.64 0.83 0.81 0.04
Unskilled workers 0.34 0.31 0.11 0.12 -0.04
Master craftsman 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.00
Part-time <15 hours/week 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Part-time >15 hours/week 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Prev. work exp. in sector (in years) 2.03 10.69 2.12 8.12 2.65
Prev. tenure in firm (in years) 1.88 8.64 2.06 9.62 -0.80
Firm-level covariates
Share of skilled workers 0.61 0.62 0.83 0.77 0.06
Share of unskilled workers 0.34 0.30 0.11 0.12 -0.05
Mean age of workforce 35.00 36.88 35.77 38.07 -0.42
1-5 employees 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.03
6-10 employees 0.26 0.27 0.19 0.20 0.01
11-20 employees 0.31 0.30 0.22 0.22 -0.01
> 20 employees 0.29 0.24 0.42 0.39 -0.02
Mean daily gross wage in firms with > 2 workers 69.23 72.09 71.44 72.81 1.49
Number of observations 125,334 375,344 137,444 471,454
Note: The unconditional DiD is computed the following way: columns (2)-(4)-((1)-(3)).
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E - Marginal effect of Dit in percentage points for placebo tests
of approaches in Section 6.1 and 6.2
Pooled Pooled Obs. Pooled Pooled Obs.
Logit LPM (in 1000) Logit LPM (in 1000)
Eastern Germany Western Germany
Placebo tests for approach in Section 6.1
1994-95 with plumbers 0.3 0.2 99 -1.7*** -1.7*** 181
1994-96 with plumbers -3.2*** -3.2*** 150 0.6** 0.8** 267
Placebo tests for approach in Section 6.2
1995-96, DiD BA data 6.5*** 5.2*** 52 -0.8 -0.1 82
1995-96, DiD LAK data 1.9 1.0 66 -3.3 -2.0 109
Note: Same specification as in Tables 4 and 6 with individual and firm-level controls;
Significance levels: * 5%, ** 1%, *** 0.1%
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F - Mean difference between non-binding and binding workers of
independent and dependent variables by sector prior to and after
the MW introduction
F.1 - Eastern Germany, BA data, 1994 - 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Roofers Plumbers Unconditional
before MW after MW before MW after MW DiD
1995 - 1996 1997 - 2007 1995 - 1996 1997 - 2007
Dependent variable: Employed in the same sector in June of next year
1995 -0.25 -0.14
1996 -0.20 -0.14
Total -0.22 -0.10 -0.14 -0.07 -0.05
Individual covariates
Age -3.16 -2.36 -3.24 -2.75 -0.31
Female 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01
No vocational degree 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02
Secondary education -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03
Tertiary education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Missing educational status -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.02
Skilled workers -0.17 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.06
Unskilled workers 0.18 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.08
Master craftsman -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01
Part-time < 15 hours/week 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Part-time > 15 hours/week 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01
Prev. work exp. in sector (in years) -0.86 -0.75 -0.61 0.32 0.83
Prev. tenure in firm (in years) -0.83 -1.68 -0.43 -0.99 0.28
Firm-level covariates
Share of skilled workers 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Share of unskilled workers 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02
Mean age of workforce -0.66 -0.05 -0.85 -0.41 -0.16
1-5 employees 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.11 -0.01
6-10 employees 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03
11-20 employees 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.05
> 20 employees -0.10 -0.11 -0.04 -0.12 -0.07
Mean daily gross wage in firms with > 2 workers -9.00 -5.87 -9.55 -8.64 -2.22
Number of observations 51,605 172,090 49,426 172,982
Note: The unconditional DiD is computed the following way: columns (2)-(4)-((1)-(3)).
F.2 - Western Germany, BA data, 1994 - 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Roofers Plumbers Unconditional
before MW after MW before MW after MW DiD
1995 - 1996 1997 - 2007 1995 - 1996 1997 - 2007
Dependent variable: Employed in the same sector in June of next year
1995 -0.22 -0.02
1996 -0.24 -0.08
Total -0.23 -0.26 -0.04 -0.10 -0.03
Individual covariates
Age -1.84 -2.21 1.05 -0.22 -0.91
Female 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.07
No vocational degree 0.11 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.03
Secondary education -0.16 -0.20 -0.02 -0.10 -0.05
Tertiary education 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00
Missing educational status 0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.02
Skilled workers -0.33 -0.37 -0.06 -0.16 -0.06
Unskilled workers 0.16 0.20 0.03 0.10 0.03
Master craftsman 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.01
Part-time < 15 hours/week 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 -0.01
Part-time > 15 hours/week 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.04
Prev. work exp. in sector (in years) -0.94 -6.09 -0.36 -2.08 3.44
Prev. tenure in firm (in years) -0.93 -5.25 -0.36 -2.69 1.99
Firm-level covariates
Share of skilled workers -0.08 -0.19 0.01 -0.08 0.02
Share of unskilled workers 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.04 -0.01
Mean age of workforce -0.65 -0.64 1.02 0.88 -0.15
1-5 employees 0.12 0.21 -0.10 0.00 0.01
6-10 employees 0.04 -0.03 -0.16 -0.10 0.13
11-20 employees -0.04 -0.08 -0.13 -0.14 0.02
> 20 employees -0.11 -0.10 0.39 0.24 -0.16
Mean daily gross wage in firms with > 2 workers -15.13 -22.52 -2.61 -7.02 2.97
Number of observations 81,969 375,079 90,937 465,157
Note: The unconditional DiD is computed the following way: columns (2)-(4)-((1)-(3)).
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G - The probability of being affected by a binding MW, by sector
and region, BA data, 1995 - 2007
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H - Probability of being affected by a binding MW (PMW ), by
year, sector, and wage decile of the wage distribution in the roof-
ing sector, BA data, 1995-2007
Eastern Germany
Year Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N
1995 Roofers 69.6 39.6 10.0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 25,470Plumbers 74.7 36.9 8.6 0.7 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 25,208
1996 Roofers 81.0 38.9 9.4 1.1 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 26,135Plumbers 82.4 36.5 7.1 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 24,218
1997 Roofers 73.6 33.3 8.1 0.8 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 24,960Plumbers 75.3 31.4 5.2 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 23,182
1998 Roofers 63.9 29.2 8.0 1.4 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 22,489Plumbers 67.9 24.3 4.9 0.7 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 21,934
1999 Roofers 57.6 24.7 6.1 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 21,524Plumbers 66.4 20.6 2.5 0.4 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 21,384
2000 Roofers 73.7 52.3 28.3 9.9 1.8 0.2 0 0 0 0 18,908Plumbers 82.3 52.4 26.8 8.7 2.3 0.2 0.1 0 0 0 18,586
2001 Roofers 66.3 40.5 21.3 8.3 2.4 0.5 0.1 0 0 0 14,968Plumbers 78.9 40.3 18.7 7.7 2.3 0.5 0 0 0 0 16,164
2002 Roofers 80.3 66.6 52.5 34.9 17.1 4.0 0.5 0.1 0 0 13,076Plumbers 88.8 68.9 52.8 35.7 18.7 4.4 0.7 0.1 0 0 13,763
2003 Roofers 82.0 70.5 59.9 47.6 31.3 13.6 3.1 0.2 0 0 12,865Plumbers 88.0 70.2 60.6 47.6 30.7 13.5 3.1 0.3 0 0 12,549
2004 Roofers 85.9 75.6 67.2 56.3 42.7 26.5 10.4 1.3 0.1 0 11,681Plumbers 95.1 79.3 68.6 56.6 43.0 25.4 9.4 1.4 0.1 0 12,195
2005 Roofers 87.4 79.3 72.6 65.5 55.2 40.6 21.2 5.9 0.7 0 10,214Plumbers 86.5 76.8 70.2 63.2 53.9 40.4 20.4 5.6 0.6 0 10,806
2006 Roofers 85.7 64.0 50.8 39.8 29.8 20.8 11.7 3.6 0.3 0 10,581Plumbers 96.3 63.7 51.4 42.0 33.4 22.7 11.3 3.2 0.2 0 10,807
2007 Roofers 83.8 70.9 60.4 49.2 37.6 25.0 11.9 2.9 0.4 0 10,824Plumbers 96.8 72.0 60.3 49.3 38.1 25.2 12.8 3.8 0.4 0 11,612
N Roofers 17,601 22,141 22,754 22,872 22,928 22,962 23,005 23,082 23,169 23,181 223,695Plumbers 36,831 26,062 23,183 20,713 16,990 18,468 17,675 16,391 16,578 29,517 222,408
Western Germany
Year Sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 N
1995 Roofers 15.6 1.4 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42,730Plumbers 32.6 1.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46,324
1996 Roofers 20.4 2.7 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39,239Plumbers 28.9 2.5 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44,613
1997 Roofers 20.3 2.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38,273Plumbers 33.0 2.3 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44,087
1998 Roofers 18.4 1.8 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36,553Plumbers 24.1 1.8 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46,132
1999 Roofers 28.0 2.3 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37,868Plumbers 24.6 2.0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46,023
2000 Roofers 41.0 7.1 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37,959Plumbers 48.3 5.7 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45,715
2001 Roofers 35.0 5.9 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 35,316Plumbers 53.7 5.1 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45,329
2002 Roofers 32.8 5.1 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33,977Plumbers 54.5 3.8 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 42,512
2003 Roofers 44.7 8.2 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 32,922Plumbers 42.7 6.4 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39,843
2004 Roofers 58.2 14.7 0.8 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 31,172Plumbers 66.8 10.9 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39,526
2005 Roofers 67.6 22.0 2.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 29,450Plumbers 67.2 20.2 1.6 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 37,979
2006 Roofers 69.3 23.9 2.7 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 29,793Plumbers 83.8 23.7 1.7 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 38,713
2007 Roofers 70.8 26 3.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 31,796Plumbers 84.8 25.1 2.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39,298
N Roofers 28,920 45,648 47,697 47,771 47,797 47,848 47,860 47,857 47,859 47,791 457,048Plumbers 45,549 58,798 52,230 51,368 52,410 47,931 43,264 38,247 45,136 121,161 556,094
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